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Abstract
Crowdfunding has emerged as an additional source for financing research in recent years. The study at hand 
identifies and tests explanatory factors influencing the success of scientific crowdfunding projects by drawing 
on news value theory, the “reputation signaling” approach, and economic theories of online payment. A 
standardized content analysis of 371 projects on English- and German-language platforms reveals that each 
theory provides factors influencing crowdfunding success. It shows that projects presented on science-
only crowdfunding platforms have a higher success rate. At the same time, projects are more likely to be 
successful if their presentation includes visualizations and humor, the lower their targeted funding is, the 
less personal data potential donors have to relinquish and the more interaction between researchers and 
donors is possible. This suggests that after donors decide to visit a scientific crowdfunding platform, factors 
unrelated to science matter more for subsequent funding decisions, raising questions about the potential and 
implications of crowdfunding science.
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1. Introduction
The relationship between science and society is changing. This change has many facets (e.g. 
Nowotny et al., 2001; Weingart, 2001), two of which are particularly relevant for this study: First, 
research funding is changing. Funding levels have stagnated or been cut in many countries (e.g. 
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Byrnes et al., 2014; Wheat et al., 2013). In addition, third-party funding from agencies like the US 
National Science Foundation (NSF), private foundations, enterprises, and so on has become more 
important in relation to public funding in many Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries (e.g. Eurostat, 2015; Jahnke, 2015).
Second, online and social media—enabling interactive, many-to-many communication in which 
user-generated content is exchanged and the distinction between senders and receivers is blurred 
(cf. Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010)—have created new interfaces between science and the broader 
public (e.g. Brossard, 2013; Dickel and Franzen, 2016). Non-scientists can observe “science in the 
making” in live-streams from scientific conferences (cf. Peterson, 2001), engage in scientific 
debates online (e.g. Trench, 2011), check scientific publications for plagiarism or fraud in online 
fora (e.g. Fähnrich et al., 2015), or participate in research through citizen science (e.g. Bonney 
et al., 2009). Nowadays, they can even—and this will be the focus of this article—fund science by 
donating money for scientific projects via crowdfunding (e.g. Vachelard et al., 2016; Wheat et al., 
2013). Crowdfunding is an
internet-based method of fundraising in which individuals solicit contributions for projects on specialized 
crowdfunding websites. The focus […] is gathering many small donations (the “crowd” in crowdfunding) 
rather than requesting a single large sum from a funding agency. Crowdfunding drives run over a limited 
timeframe[,] and attempt to meet a funding goal before the end of the campaign. (Wheat et al., 2013: 71)
Four crowdfunding variants have been identified (cf. Hollow, 2013: 71; Schwarz, 2013: 12): In 
equity-based crowdfunding, donors invest in business projects and receive dividends or shares in 
case of success. In lending-based crowdfunding, donors lend money to applicants and get interest 
in return. Reward-based crowdfunding rewards donor contributions in non-monetary ways, for 
example by providing services or products. In donation-based crowdfunding, donors do not receive 
a material return. This is by far the most common variant with regard to scientific projects (Wheat 
et al., 2013: 72), and we will focus on it in our study.
Crowdfunding has become increasingly important in recent years, with a global volume estimated 
at more than US$5 billion in 2014 (Broderick, 2014). Crowdfunding projects have been used to 
finance businesses, music albums and movies, novel forms of journalism, and more (for overviews, 
see Bennett et al., 2015; Lambert and Schwienbacher, 2010). It also seems to be increasingly used as 
a source to fund science. Several high-profile scientific projects have already been crowdfunded, 
including an orbital space telescope which received US$1.5 million (Sich, 2015). General-interest 
crowdfunding platforms like Indiegogo, Kickstarter, or RocketHub have hosted numerous scientific 
projects, and platforms like experiment.com, petridish.org, or sciencestarter.de focus exclusively on 
crowdfunding science. On these platforms, hundreds of scientists ask donors to fund field trips, data 
analysis, publications, or entire projects. The total amount of money raised as well as the number of 
funded projects have increased considerably in recent years (Vachelard et al., 2016: 1f.).
The way scientists seek funding on these platforms is an interesting object for scholars of science 
communication because it has novel features: On crowdfunding platforms, scientists have to engage in 
external communication at a very early stage in the research process. “Instead of disseminating results 
to a broader community upon completion of the research, crowdfunding garners public support before 
research is initiated” (Wheat et al., 2013: 71). In addition, this communication has to appeal to poten-
tial donors beyond the circle of immediate scientific peers and the scientific community, in a way that 
convinces the audience to make a financial contribution. Scientists approach this challenge differently: 
Some use scientific jargon, explaining their research with disciplinary nomenclature. Others employ 
colloquial language, trying to be easily understandable to the broader public. Many use images or 
audiovisual material, from personal statements to computer animations (cf. Vachelard et al., 2016).
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As of yet, however, an empirical assessment of these different communicative strategies is lack-
ing. There have been almost no peer-reviewed studies on this topic (cf. Mollick, 2014: 4). While 
studies on crowdfunding in other fields have described the characteristics of donors (e.g. 
Belleflamme et al., 2014), the nature of donor–applicant interactions (e.g. Sargeant et al., 2007), or 
the use of website elements (e.g. Ingenhoff and Koelling, 2009), a mapping of the presentations of 
scientific projects on crowdfunding platforms as well as an assessment of the factors making these 
projects successful is lacking.
The study at hand tackles this question, asking, What factors influence the financial success of 
scientific projects on crowdfunding platforms? It assesses which project presentations make people 
more likely to engage with scientific projects—and it does so using people’s funding decisions as 
an indicator, that is, a form of “strong” public engagement in science as it involves people’s finan-
cial resources.
In doing so, the analysis presented here also offers an assessment of hopes and concerns that have 
been voiced with regard to the crowdfunding of science. Its proponents have argued that scientists 
should explore new avenues to acquire research money, as science is getting more elaborate and 
costly and as funding is harder to come by (e.g. Byrnes et al., 2014; Wheat et al., 2013). And although
crowdfunding cannot be the solution to the current funding crisis, it can be a viable alternative for certain 
types of research projects [, as] scientists (especially in their early careers), students, and researchers in 
developing countries (where research funding is scarcer), have started to seek funding through 
“crowdfunding.” (Vachelard et al., 2016: 1)
In addition, crowdfunding has been described as a way to alleviate alleged problems in the tradi-
tional grant system, which has been characterized as tending to fund “lower-risk, longer term 
projects, given to older scientists” and as “inefficient, risk-averse, and often times political” (Frood, 
2015), whereas crowdfunding is portrayed as reaching a broader audience, as being more “demo-
cratic” and as allowing the public to decide directly what kind of science should get financed (e.g. 
Davidson and Poor, 2016: 127; Sciencestarter, 2016; Wheat et al., 2013: 71).
In contrast, a number of concerns have been voiced about crowdfunding science, mainly with 
regard to quality control and the importance of peer evaluation (cf. Agrawal et al., 2013: 8f.). If 
research funding is decided by non-experts, it is argued, quality control is lacking and certain kinds 
of necessary, but complex or seemingly less appealing projects might not receive enough funds (cf. 
Bennett et al., 2015; Patel, 2015). The result might be that only “panda bear science” gets funded, 
that is, research that is “super sexy or [has] to do with cuddly animals” (Siva, 2014: 1086), but may 
lack scientific substance.
2. Theoretical framework
These hopes and concerns have not yet been met by empirical studies (cf. Mollick, 2014), and no con-
ceptual model exists to explain the crowdfunding success of scientific projects. There are, however, a 
number of related theoretical strands which can be utilized here: news value theory, the “reputation 
signaling” approach (Agrawal et al., 2013), economic theories explaining the willingness of people to 
make online payments, and assumptions about the effects of crowd size and crowd interest.
News value theory
News value theory aims to explain which issues or events journalists select for coverage in news 
media and how they present them (e.g. Shoemaker and Reese, 1995: 105ff.). It posits that 
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journalists look for “news factors” in these issues and events, such as novelty, personalization, or 
the participation of elite persons, and that issues and events are more likely to be covered, and more 
prominently so, if they embody these news factors to a large degree, that is, if they have strong 
“news value” (for classical accounts, see Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Östgaard, 1965).
News value theory can inform our study because it represents journalists’ operationalizations of 
audience interest. News factors “embody assumptions about […] the composition, wants or tastes 
of those who are being addressed” (Schlesinger, 1987: 115f.) and what they “find interesting and 
important to know about” (Shoemaker and Reese, 1995: 106). Research has also shown that audi-
ences of news media tend to select news items that have high news value, that they study them 
longer and more thoroughly (Eilders, 1997: 264ff., 2006), and that this seems to hold true for 
online environments as well (Engelmann and Wendelin, 2015).
As news factors operationalize audience interest, they should also be relevant for the study of 
crowdfunding science: A prerequisite for an online user spending money on a crowdfunding pro-
ject is that the respective project catches his or her attention.
It has to be taken into account, however, that scientific issues have specific news factors, which 
do partly, but not fully, mirror the general news factors that have been established for other issues. 
Badenschier and Wormer (2011) found that several general news factors such as actuality and per-
sonalization apply to scientific issues as well, but that some news factors exist which are specific 
for science issues, such as scientific relevance or the question whether a scientific finding was 
arrived at intentionally or not (“intention”). These findings will inform our study—with some 
adjustments, as crowdfunding projects differ from media content in that they do not present daily 
or weekly news from various fields of society, but specific scientific projects which are often not 
finished at the time of presentation and unable to present results (cf. Wheat et al., 2013).
In general, we assume that news factors influence the success of scientific projects on crowd-
funding platforms. We hypothesize that the stronger relevant news factors are presented in project 
proposals on crowdfunding websites, the more successful these projects will be (H1).
Reputation signaling
If a scientific project on a crowdfunding site has caught their attention, potential donors have to 
assess whether the project merits a donation. This assessment is difficult because of “the particu-
larly high degree of information asymmetry” (Agrawal et al., 2013: 18; cf. Herzenstein et al., 2011; 
Lin et al., 2013) inherent in crowdfunding. Donors have less information about the projects and 
their chances of realization available than applicants. Crowdfunding scholars have, therefore, 
argued that the best solution for applicants is to “signal” their reputation, which may serve as an 
incentive for donors to trust applicants, and, subsequently, finance their projects (Ahlers et al., 
2015; Cabral, 2012; Metzger and Flanagin, 2013: 214f.; Mollick, 2013).
In online settings, three mechanisms of “reputation signaling” have been distinguished (Agrawal 
et al., 2013: 22ff.): First, “quality signals” (Agrawal et al., 2013: 22f.; Mollick, 2014: 7) address 
the problem that for potential donors, the quality of proposed products or projects is hard to assess. 
This particularly applies to scientific projects. In comparison with “low-touch” products such as 
CDs, which are available from various providers at the same quality (cf. Kim et al., 2012), scien-
tific products are complex, often presented with a certain nomenclature, need an understanding of 
certain concepts or methodologies, and do not usually produce immediate, tangible results (Wheat 
et al., 2013: 72). This is why they are traditionally evaluated by peers—and even they have diffi-
culties doing so consistently (see the meta-analyses of Mutz et al., 2012; Siler et al., 2015). Under 
these circumstances, it is likely that potential donors base their quality assessments at least partly 
on “quality signals” instead of robust judgments. Quality signals that have been demonstrated to be 
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effective in other areas are the brands to which a product belongs (e.g. Rademacher and Siegert, 
2007: 489ff.; Waldfogel and Chen, 2006), the education level of the applicant (Ahlers et al., 2015), 
or his or her earlier achievements such as patents or successful sales (Häussler et al., 2012; Hsu and 
Ziedonis, 2013). For scientific projects, equivalent quality signals might be the academic titles or 
honors of an applicant, or the length and complexity of the project presentation itself, that is, its 
“scientific-ness” (Wheat et al., 2013). In addition, the promise of “perks”—donor gratifications 
like mentions on a research paper or visits to a research facility—has been shown to function as 
quality signals (Davidson and Poor, 2016: 129; Varian, 2012). We hypothesize that the more qual-
ity signals a project proposal displays, the more successful the respective project will be (H2).
Second, “feedback systems” (Agrawal et al., 2013: 23f.; Metzger et al., 2010: 420) are seen as 
effective signals for improving reputation. This has been shown in research on online auctions 
(Cabral, 2012; Tucker and Zhang, 2011), where elaborate feedback mechanisms such as buyer/
seller rating systems are available. These are usually not available on crowdfunding platforms and 
would apply less to them anyway, as interactions there are less frequent (cf. Agrawal et al., 2013: 
23). Crowdfunding scholars have argued, however, that feedback mechanisms should still be rel-
evant (cf. Davidson and Poor, 2016: 129). Even a basic, one-way feedback mechanism from the 
applicants to potential donors has been assumed to signal transparency (Flanagin and Metzger, 
2007), to demonstrate the applicants’ commitment to the project (Vachelard et al., 2016: 5) and 
their “accountability to funders” (Bennett et al., 2015: 145). Two-way, dialogical feedback mecha-
nisms, where users can question applicants, are seen as even stronger signals, as they make evalu-
ative comments of the project possible (cf. Metzger et al., 2010: 420). Therefore, we hypothesize 
that the existence of one-way or two-way feedback mechanisms will increase the success of the 
respective projects (H3).
Third, “trustworthy intermediaries” (Agrawal et al., 2013: 24), “endorsements” (Metzger and 
Flanagin, 2013: 215), or “social recommendations” (Metzger et al., 2010: 420ff.) have been shown 
to be effective reputation signals (cf. Jin and Kato, 2007). Applicants and project descriptions can 
profit from the “conferred credibility” of peer or media testimonials, as donors are more “inclined 
to perceive information and sources as credible if others do so also” (Metzger et al., 2010: 427). 
Accordingly, we hypothesize that positive endorsements of the applicant or his or her project 
increase the success of the project (H4).
Theories of online payment
The willingness of Internet users to make payments online has been mainly analyzed with regard 
to crowdfunding in fields other than science (e.g. Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2015; Mollick, 2014; 
Schwienbacher and Larralde, 2010), to commercial products in economics and marketing (e.g. 
Kim et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2005), and to news content in journalism studies (e.g. Burtch et al., 
2013; Lischka and Rademacher, 2012; Rademacher and Siegert, 2007).
The respective studies show that apart from the perceived product quality, two additional factors 
influence users’ willingness to make online payments: The first are the characteristics of the pay-
ment process (cf. Burtch et al., 2015; Rademacher and Siegert, 2007; Wang et al., 2005). Online 
payments differ from those offline: They can be tedious, and users may be forced to relinquish 
sensitive information (such as e-mail addresses or credit card numbers) in contexts they may not 
know well and which may be insecure. Since the convenience and security of the payment process 
influence payment decisions online (e.g. Burtch et al., 2015; Dou, 2004; Lischka and Rademacher, 
2012; Wang et al., 2005), we assume that they will also influence people’s willingness to donate 
money on crowdfunding platforms: The more information an individual has to relinquish to make 
a donation, the less successful the respective project will be (H5).
6 Public Understanding of Science 
Another factor that influences users’ willingness to make online payments is the price of a pro-
duct. This has been demonstrated for consumer decisions (e.g. Kim et al., 2012; Meer, 2014) and 
for users paying for news content (e.g. Chyi, 2012; Lischka and Rademacher, 2012)—with lower 
prices in each case increasing the likelihood of payment. It is also in line with crowdfunding stud-
ies showing that “increasing goal size is negatively associated with success” (Mollick, 2014: 8) and 
with scholars assuming that crowdfunding may be particularly suitable for small- to medium-sized 
projects (Patel, 2015; Schmiedgen, 2014: 136ff.; Vachelard et al., 2016). Therefore, we hypothe-
size that the lower the total price of a scientific project is, the more successful it will be on crowd-
funding platforms (H6). We do not expect a strong effect here, however, as donors—different from 
other online merchandises—are able to individually determine the amount of money they would 
like to donate for a project.1
Social factors: Size and topical interest of the “crowd”
In addition, a number of studies have emphasized that characteristics of the “crowd” itself, that is, 
of the social communities and networks around platforms and projects, play an important role for 
crowdfunding success (e.g. Agrawal et al., 2013; Davidson and Poor, 2016: 129; Lin et al., 2013). 
Two characteristics have been described as influential: The first is the size of the crowd. That a 
“larger crowd [is] translating into more money raised” (Wheat et al., 2013: 72) has been shown 
repeatedly in crowdfunding studies apart from scientific projects (Byrnes et al., 2014: 12; Fisk 
et al., 2011: 444; Mollick, 2014; cf. Vachelard et al., 2016): The more users see a project, the more 
likely it is going to be successful. Therefore, we hypothesize that the more user traffic a crowd-
funding platform has, the more successful the respective projects will be (H7).
The second factor is whether a particular crowd is likely to be interested in a project (cf. Byrnes 
et al., 2014: 12). If the respective crowd has a general interest in science, it may be more likely to 
donate for scientific projects. As the interest of users on crowdfunding platforms which only offer 
scientific projects is likely to be higher than elsewhere, we assume that scientific projects will be 
more successful on crowdfunding platforms that focus on scientific projects only (H8).
3. Data and methods
Data
Our analysis included crowdfunding platforms specifically focusing on scientific projects as well 
as general-interest platforms, in English and German, as long as they had also been presenting 
scientific projects by 1 July 2014 (when our selection process ended). We included all projects that 
were deemed as “scientific” according to our search criteria in the analysis. Whether or not a pro-
ject was deemed as “scientific” was determined in several steps. First, we searched platforms for 
projects containing a number of keywords which were developed in an iterative process: “aca-
demic,” “analysis,” “department,” “dissertation,” “doctoral,” “examination,” “exploration,” “grad-
uate,” “investigation,” “research,” “scholarly,” “science,” “scientific,” “study,” “survey,” and 
“university” (as well as their German translations). In a second step, all projects containing at least 
one of these terms were manually screened by four coders and excluded if they did not constitute 
scientific projects. Both successfully funded and unsuccessful projects were included if they were 
finished by 1 July 2014. On this date, a total of 371 scientific projects were chosen for analysis 
among the thousands of non-scientific projects looking for crowdfunding.
The 371 scientific projects we selected stem from 11 crowdfunding platforms (see Table 1). 
Nine of them are English-speaking platforms; six of them are general-interest sites offering 
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crowdfunding projects from different fields such as music, movies, art, games, business, media, 
and so on. One of them—medstartr.com—focuses on medicine and health-related projects. Four 
are platforms for scientific projects only.
Methods and operationalization
The 371 projects were analyzed using standardized content analysis. The codebook contained 54 
variables, e.g. formal and general characteristics of platform (name, URL, etc.) and project (name, 
URL, and research location). The dependent and independent variables were operationalized as 
follows (see Table 2 for more detail):
•• Dependent variable. The success of a crowdfunding project can be measured in various ways, 
for example, by the total amount of money that was raised or by the number of donors. The 
most relevant measure of success from the perspective of the applicants is whether they 
acquire the requested funding.2 While this would indicate a dichotomous-dependent (yes/no) 
Table 1. Overview of the crowdfunding platforms included in our analysis and the scientific projects 
found there.
Platform General characterization of the platform, its 
history, and the total no. of projects it features
No. of science-related projects in 
our sample (of those: ⩾100% funded; 
average amount of donations)
Experiment.com Science-only platform, English, online since 
2012, until January 2015: 11,328 donors 
donated US$1.3 million for 3888 projects (cf. 
Experiment.com 2014)
148 (141; US$4674)
Fundly.com General platform, English, online since 2009 18 (2; US$96,456)
Indiegogo.com General platform, multilingual, online since 2008 54 (11; US$1000)
Kickstarter.com General platform, English, online since 2009, 
since 2009: 7.7 million donors donated 
approximately US$1 billion for 76,000 projects 
(cf. Kickstarter.com 2015)
3 (3; US$14,500)
Medstartr.com Platform focusing on health projects, English, 
online since 2012, until 2013: >US$150,000 
donated (cf. medstartr.com 2013)
3 (3; US$3000)
Petridish.org Science-only platform, English, online since 2011 19 (19; US$3686)
Pozible.com General platform, English, online since 2010, 
since 2010: US$25.5 million donated for 7851 
projects (cf. pozible.com 2015)
18 (7; US$66,055)
Rally.org General platform, English, online since 2009 
(rebranded in 2011), until 2013: 5 million users 
donated for 25,000 projects (cf. rally.org 2013)
3 (1; US$10,000)
Rockethub.org General platform, English, online since 2010 80 (46; US$3580)
Sciencestarter.de Science-only platform, German, online since 2012 13 (13; US$5676a)
Sciflies.org Science-only platform, English, online since 2010 12 (2; US$44,895)
Total 11 platforms 371 (246; US$4082)
aDonations on Sciencestarter.de were made in euros and converted into US dollars here.
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variable, the extent to which applicants reach their self-defined goal can be measured in more 
detail. Mollick has proposed to use the “funding level” as a measure of crowdfunding suc-
cess, that is, the “percentage of a project’s goal that is actually raised by founders” (Mollick, 
2014: 5). The advantage of this measure—which we decided to use here—is that it is highly 
relevant for applicants themselves, equally applicable to successful and unsuccessful pro-
jects, and available on all coded platforms (while, for example, the number of donors was not 
available on all platforms).
In addition, the codebook contained independent variables operationalizing the theoretical strands 
outlined above.
•• Several variables pertaining to news value theory were taken from the “adapted science 
news value theory” (Badenschier and Wormer, 2011: 61ff.): the “astonishment” of the envis-
aged project, measured by the amount of superlatives and hyperboles used in its description; 
its “presentation in graphical form” or visualization, measured as the number of images and 
videos in the project description; the “personalization” of the project, that is, the extent to 
which personal information about the researchers such as hobbies, family members, or mar-
ital status was provided; the question whether or not “references to elite persons” such as 
decisions makers, heads of state, or celebrities were made; and the project’s “scientific 
scope,” that is, the question whether it was presented as being relevant for a sub-disciplinary 
field only, for an entire discipline, or for several disciplines. Moreover, we added one factor 
which seems to occur more often in science communication recently (Bore and Reid, 2014; 
Riesch, 2014), frequently appeared in our sample, and is often recommended for creating 
successful crowdfunding projects (Mollick, 2014; Vachelard et al., 2016; Wheat et al., 
2013): the extent to which humor was used to present the proposed project.
•• In addition, “reputation signaling” factors were coded. Five variables were included as 
“quality signals”: the highest academic title of the applicant(s) as an ordinal variable, scien-
tific awards or honors he or she received and mentions in the project description, and the 
length of the project description (in words) and the complexity of the project presentation 
itself. In addition, it was coded whether or not “perks” were offered to donors. A variable 
assessing “feedback mechanisms” was included, coding whether a one-way, a two-way, or 
both mechanisms existed. Furthermore, the existence of “trustworthy intermediaries” and 
endorsements was coded, that is, whether the crowdfunding platform has a scientific spon-
sor such as a renowned scientific journal, whether the project description displayed media 
features about or testimonials for applicant or project, and whether the platform displayed 
media features about or testimonials for itself.
•• From theories explaining online payments we derived two explanatory factors: the total 
price of the project, measured as the targeted amount in US dollars, and the security of the 
payment process, operationalized as the amount of personal information individuals have to 
lay open before being able to make a donation.3
•• Two variables operationalizing the size and interest of the crowd were added: the number of 
monthly users of the crowdfunding platform, based on alexa.com measurements, and the 
information whether it is a general-interest or science-only crowdfunding platform.
We included the discipline of the project as a control variable since not all disciplines may be 
equally likely to attract donors (cf. Wheat et al., 2013: 72). Numerous studies have shown, for 
example, that the news media take up scientific topics to different degrees, likely due to the differ-
ent audience appeal of these disciplines. The disciplines that have been represented most 
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extensively in recent decades are medicine and biology, with other natural sciences and engineer-
ing science following (e.g. Bauer, 2011; Elmer et al., 2008).
A team of four coders coded these variables for all projects. Coding was pretested using 20 
project descriptions. Intercoder reliability across all variables was 0.901 (Holsti coefficient), and 
no single variable had a coefficient below 0.7.
4. Results
Description of scientific crowdfunding projects
Of the 371 scientific projects included in our analysis, 66% (n = 246) were successful, that is, 
reached or exceeded their self-defined funding goal (see Table 3). This is in line with the 70% aver-
age success rate of scientific projects reported by the SciFund Challenge (Vachelard et al., 2016: 
1f.), and it clearly exceeds the funding rates of most funding agencies or foundations which are 
significantly lower (e.g. NSF, 2015b: 5).
In turn, however, the targeted and received sums on crowdfunding platforms are considerably 
lower than, for example, the US$170,000 which are awarded for an average NSF proposal  (NSF, 
2015a). Almost two-thirds of all analyzed crowdfunding projects (64.8%) target amounts of up to 
US$5000, and only 12.1% aim for more than US$15,000. The funding they actually acquire is even 
lower: The average sum of donations the projects received was approximately US$4000; 29.9% of 
all projects received  less than US$1000, with only 4.8% acquiring more than US$15,000.
These comparatively small amounts are the aggregate of many donations. On average, projects 
have 39 donors, with about one-quarter of all projects having up to 10, between 11 and 15, between 
26 and 50, or more than 50 donors. Accordingly, most donations lie between US$11 and US$100.
Typically, applicants of scientific projects on crowdfunding platforms are early-career, individual 
scholars from Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) disciplines (82.8% of all 
applicants come from the natural sciences, medicine, or engineering). The large majority of all pro-
jects come from single applicants. They mostly apply for crowdfunding to finance data acquisition, 
to buy research materials, or to finance research trips, that is, for early stages of their research. 
Research outcomes such as prototypes or publications feature in less than 10% of all applications.
What factors influence the financial success of these projects?
We used linear regression analysis to test the influence of the various independent variables on the 
projects’ funding levels. Independent variables were entered stepwise into the analysis, resulting in 
five models.4
In model 1, the control variables were introduced, that is, dummy variables indicating the scien-
tific disciplines the projects belong to. Belonging to any one of these disciplines, however, does not 
significantly influence the level of funding a project receives. No disciplinary field receives sig-
nificantly more, or less, funding when compared to projects from the arts, which served as refer-
ence variable. Accordingly, model 1 does not explain a large amount of the dependent variable’s 
variance (.019).
Model 2 adds the variables derived from news value theory. They improve the model’s explained 
variance to a significant, but moderate degree (.044*). This is mainly due to one significant news 
factor: The use of humor in project descriptions clearly increases funding levels. While the visuali-
zation of the project, i.e. the use of graphical materials such as pictures and videos, points in the 
expected direction without exhibiting a significant effect, no other news factors—including the 
scientific range of the project or an extensive personalization—influence the funding level.
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Table 3. Project characteristics: overview (N = 371).
Project success
 Unsuccessful 33%
 Successful 66%
Targeted amount (in US$)
 0–1000 15.9%
 1001–2000 15.4%
 2001–5000 34.5%
 5001–15,000 22.1%
 >15,000 12.1%
Acquired amount (in US$)
 0–1000 29.9%
 1001–2000 15.9%
 2001–5000 38.1%
 5001–15,000 21.5%
 >15,000 4.8%
Number of donors
 0–10 23.5%
 11–25 27.2%
 26–50 25.8%
 51–100 14.6%
 >100 8.9%
Average donation per donor (in US$)
 0–10 9.7%
 11–50 24.0%
 51–100 34.8%
 101–150 12.4%
 151–500 16.4%
 >500 2.7%
Academic rank of applicant(s)
 Student (bachelor, master, or equivalent) 38.0%
 Doctoral student 24.3%
 Postdoc 24.5%
 Professor 5.4%
 Other 7.6%
Number of applicants
 1 76.8%
 2 8.1%
 3 3.8%
 >3 11.3%
Object of project
 Financing data acquisition 21.3%
 Research trip 20.8%
 Buying research material 28.3%
 Personal 12.7%
 Prototype production 7.0%
 Publication 2.2%
 Other 7.9%
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Table 4. Linear regression, method: stepwise (N = 370).
Dependent variable Funding level (%)
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Control variables: scientific discipline
 Natural science (1 = yes, 0 = no) −.004 −.058 −.069 −.060 −.071
 Medicine (1 = yes, 0 = no) −.130 −.182 −.171 −.054 −.031
 Engineering (1 = yes, 0 = no) −.076 −.119 −.079 −.032 −.028
 Social science (1 = yes, 0 = no) .004 −.023 −.031 −.009 −.007
News value theory variables
 Astonishment .046 .041 .052 .062
 Visualization .067^ .072^ .086^ .093*
 Personalization −.063 .037 .034 .019
 Reference to elite persons (1 = yes, 0 = no) .034 −.007 −.004 .005
 Scientific scope .103 .090^ .080^ .062
 Humor .135** .101* .096* .109**
Reputation signaling variables
Quality signals
 Academic title of applicant .060 .042 .027
 Prices and honors (1 = yes, 0 = no) .115* .123** .077^
 Message complexity −.030 −.068 −.072
 Message length .029 .045 .040
 Existence of perks .260** .006 .089
Feedback mechanisms
 Existence of feedback options .201*** .057 .182**
Trustworthy intermediaries
  Academic platform sponsor (1 = yes, 0 = no) −.092 −.082 −.056
  Media features or testimonials of project 
(1 = yes, 0 = no)
.063 .040 .029
  Media features or testimonials of platform 
(1 = yes, 0 = no)
.395*** .199** .044
Online payment variables
 Targeted amount in US dollars −.210*** −.221***
 Amount of personal data −.349*** −.185**
Size and interest of crowd
 Users per month −.064
  General or scientific platform (1 = scientific 
platform, 0 = general platform)
.275***
Increase in R2 .019 .044* .247*** .096*** .033***
Total R2 .019 .063 .310 .406 .439
Indicated are standardized beta coefficients. Dependent variable: funding level (%).
Levels of significance: ^p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01;***p < .001.
Table 3. (Continued)
Main discipline of project
 Natural science 55.5%
 Medicine 18.1%
 Engineering 9.2%
 Social science 12.4%
 Arts 4.9%
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Model 3 introduces the variables taken from “reputation signaling” approaches. In comparison 
with all other (groups of) variables, they improve the model strongly (.247***). Among these nine 
variables, four show significant effects: Awards or honors which the applicant or his or her project 
has received and mention, the promise of perks, and the existence of media features and testimoni-
als that underline the reputation of the crowdfunding platform all positively impact funding levels. 
These effects, however, dissolve later as other variables are included in subsequent models. The 
fourth influential factor, which remains significant later on, is the existence of feedback mecha-
nisms between applicants and donors: One-way and, particularly, two-way feedback mechanisms 
clearly increase the funding a project receives.
Adding the online payment variables in model 4 again improves the explained variance 
(.096***). Both variables included here show the expected effects: The amount of personal infor-
mation potential donors have to relinquish, in particular, is strongly and negatively correlated with 
funding levels: When donors are forced to provide a lot of personal information, they are less likely 
to make a donation. Additionally, the targeted sum also negatively influences funding levels: 
Projects which apply for large sums have systematically lower funding levels.
The final model 5, including the size and interest of the crowd and, thus, containing all factors 
that were conceptually identified as potentially relevant, further improves the explanatory power 
of the regression (.033***). It shows that projects presented on crowdfunding platforms which 
only focus on scientific projects, such as experiment.com or petridish.org, receive significantly 
more funding than projects on general-interest platforms and that this factor is stronger than all 
other variables which were included in our analysis. In turn, the number of users a project’s plat-
form has per month does not influence funding levels.
Overall, the regression model explains a comparatively high 44% of the dependent variable’s 
variance. In the final model, the news factors visualization and humor, the existence of feedback 
mechanisms between applicants and donors, the targeted sum, the amount of personal data a donor 
has to relinquish, and whether the project is hosted on a science-only or general-interest platform 
significantly influence funding levels.
5. Discussion
The study at hand attempts to explain the success of scientific projects on crowdfunding platforms 
by integrating news value theory, “reputation signaling,” and economic theories of online payment. 
A standardized content analysis of scientific projects revealed that each theory contributes relevant 
explanatory factors. Overall, with accounting for 44% of explained variance, they explain the 
crowdfunding success of scientific projects quite well.
Projects which are presented on science-only crowdfunding platforms have a much higher 
chance of success (H8, see Table 5). At the same time, projects are more likely to be successful if 
they are presented humorously and include visualizations (H1), the lower their targeted funding is 
(H6), and the less personal data potential donors have to relinquish when they donate money (H5). 
In addition, if projects allow for interactivity between the researchers and potential donors, this 
increases crowdfunding success (H3).
These results suggest that potential donors may choose the crowdfunding platform they visit 
based on a scientific criterion—that is, whether it is a crowdfunding platform specifically focused 
on scientific projects or not. But this initial focus on scientific characteristics does not seem to last 
once the respective platform has been selected. Detailed scientific indicators and credentials of the 
platform (such as the question whether it is sponsored by scientific institutions; H4), the applicants 
(such as their scientific titles, prices, or honors; H2), or the project itself (such as its scientific range 
or the discipline it comes from) do not significantly influence crowdfunding success and neither 
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does the site traffic of the platform (H7). Once donors have decided on a platform, factors unrelated 
to science seem to matter more for funding decisions: Whether proposals are presented in an easily 
approachable way, through adding humor, visuals, or an interactive presentation, is more important 
for receiving donations than a proposal’s scientific content, relevance, or discipline. Furthermore, 
the security of the payment process has a strong influence on crowdfunding success. These find-
ings underline some of the problematic aspects of the crowdfunding of scientific projects. It has 
been feared that crowdfunding might favor “sexy” but insubstantial “panda bear science” (Siva, 
2014), and our results suggest that factors related to the scientific quality of the proposed projects 
are indeed less important for crowdfunding success.
These findings could be indicative of the current changes in the relation between science and 
society, particularly for an increasingly “contextualized” (Nowotny et al., 2001) or “societalized” 
(Weingart, 2001) science. For science crowdfunding, they suggest that non-scientific factors not 
only play an important role, but that they are more important than scientific criteria.
Our study also shows that crowdfunding is still a marginal phenomenon within science funding. 
It is mainly used to acquire smaller amounts of money for specific parts of research projects, and 
the donated amounts are minor in comparison with public or foundation-based research funding. 
All 371 crowdfunding projects analyzed here, in sum, received approximately US$1.5 million—an 
amount equivalent to nine average projects funded by the NSF (2015a). But we could show that 
crowdfunding is mainly employed by early-career researchers, for whom it may represent their 
first avenue into research funding. Via crowdfunding, (some) young scholars may be socialized 
into project applications in a way where problematic criteria apply.
These results need to be substantiated further. Our study represents a first foray into the explana-
tion of crowdfunding success, which has not yet been analyzed empirically with regard to scientific 
projects. Although we conducted an analysis of all scientific projects that were presented on crowd-
funding platforms at the given date, future studies should expand this database. In cooperation with 
crowdfunding platforms, for example, it would be possible to employ larger n analyses of crowd-
funding characteristics and successes (e.g. Herzenstein et al., 2011). Future studies should also take 
additional explanatory factors into account. They could include additional information about the 
Table 5. Assessment of the formulated hypotheses.
Hypothesis Evaluation
H1. The stronger relevant news factors are presented in project proposals 
on crowdfunding websites, the more successful these projects will be.
Partly true 
(visualization, humor)
H2.The more quality signals a project proposal displays, the more successful 
the respective project will be.
False
H3. The existence of one-way or two-way feedback mechanisms will make 
the respective projects more successful.
True.
H4. Positive endorsements of the applicant or his or her project increase 
the success of the project.
False.
H5. The more information an individual has to relinquish to make a 
donation, the less successful the respective project will be.
True
H6. The lower the total price of a scientific project is, the more successful it 
will be on crowdfunding platforms.
True
H7. The more users are likely to see a project, the more likely it is to be 
successful.
False
H8. Scientific projects will be more successful on crowdfunding platforms 
that focus on scientific projects only.
True
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researchers which is publicly available, such as their Facebook or Twitter profiles or networks 
(Byrnes et al., 2014; Lin et al., 2013), the concrete payment mechanisms of crowdfunding plat-
forms (Cumming et al., 2015), or the “herding behavior” that has been shown among donors, mak-
ing donations more likely if others have donated before (Agrawal et al., 2013: 4f.; Herzenstein 
et al., 2011). As STEM projects are dominant on crowdfunding platforms, it would also be interest-
ing to analyze for each discipline seperately if different factors are influential for the success of a 
project. Analyses of the crowdfunding of scientific projects would also benefit from connecting 
content analysis to experimental or survey research testing assumptions about crowdfunding suc-
cesses among potential donors (similar to Burtch et al., 2015). In general, future studies should 
develop an integrated explanatory model not only identifying the relevant factors but also mode-
ling the interrelations between them in more detail.
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Notes
1. Not all crowdfunding platforms allow users to determine the size of their donations completely freely, 
but all offer varying donation sizes and small donations as well as large ones.
2. This can be an important threshold as some crowdfunding platforms withhold payment to applicants if 
they only receive part of the requested funding.
3. The total price variable was logged to control for outliers. We also coded the number of times an indi-
vidual had to click and/or fill in a textbox on the way from the project description to being able to donate 
money in order to assess the convenience of the payment process, but as this variable was strongly cor-
related (.79***) with the amount of personal information that had to be disclosed, we excluded it from 
the statistical model to reduce multicollinearity.
4. One project acquired 577% of its funding goal and thus constituted an extreme outlier for our dependent 
variable. We excluded this case from the regression analysis.
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